Коментар General Economics and Teaching

The foundations of contemporary economics: Gordon Tullock and public choice

Henrik Egbert - Anhalt University of Applied Sciences, Germany
Teodor Sedlarski - Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski
Received: 02 Jun 2022
Revised:
Published:
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Issue 1/2020
JEL А10
DOI https://doi.org/10.56497/etj2065105

Abstract

A briefly summary is given of the path-breaking ideas of Gordon Tullock (1922-2014). Tullock can be considered one of the founders of public choice. He initiated a new way of thinking and applied rational choice theory to the political and juridical system. His ideas of rent-seeking behavior, majority voting, bureaucratic inefficiency, constitutional design, and the transfer of the public good problem to political decisions have become cornerstones of economic thought.

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